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Data often contains sensitive information, which poses a major ob-
stacle to publishing it. Some suggest to obfuscate the data or only re-
leasing some data statistics. These approaches have, however, been
shown to provide insufficient safeguards against de-anonymisation.
Recently, differential privacy (DP), an approach that injects noise
into the query answers to provide statistical privacy guarantees,
has emerged as a solution to release sensitive data. This study inves-
tigates how to continuously release privacy-preserving histograms
(or distributions) from online streams of sensitive data by combin-
ing DP and semantic web technologies. We focus on distributions,
as they are the basis for many analytic applications. Specifically,
we propose SihlQL, a query language that processes RDF streams
in a privacy-preserving fashion. SihlQL builds on top of SPARQL
and the w-event DP framework. We show how some peculiarities
of w-event privacy constrain the expressiveness of SihlQL queries.
Addressing these constraints, we propose an extension of w-event
privacy that provides answers to a larger class of queries while
preserving their privacy. To evaluate SihlQL, we implemented a
prototype engine that compiles queries to Apache Flink topologies
and studied its privacy properties using real-world data from an
IPTV provider and an online e-commerce web site.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Companies, public administrations, and individuals show an active
interest in sharing their data on the web. The linked open gov-
ernment data movement is a successful example of this trend [21],
which has been joined by several companies, such as BBC and New
York Times. While there is potential value in sharing data about cit-
izens or customers, there are critical privacy-related risks that must
be taken into account. In the past, data owners used obfuscation and
anonymisation techniques to share datasets, but these solutions led
to scandals like the Netflix challenge [20] and the Massachusetts
hospital [24] ones. Record linkage is a common technique to crack
those techniques: by discovering links between the anonymised
dataset and one, where users are known, researchers have shown
This paper is published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
(CC-BY 4.0) license. Authors reserve their rights to disseminate the work on their
personal and corporate Web sites with the appropriate attribution.
WWW ’20, April 20ś24, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan
© 2020 IW3C2 (International World Wide Web Conference Committee), published
under Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 License.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-7023-3/20/04.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3366423.3380265
that user re-identification is possible. A solution emerged in mid-
2000s when Dwork proposed differential privacy [10]. The intuition
behind differential privacy is to introduce noise into query answers,
such that it becomes hard to state if the data contains a specific user.
Differential privacy has been intensively studied in the last decade
and today is used in different companies, such as Google and Apple
[11, 25], to let their data scientists analyse the data collected from
their users in a privacy-preserving manner.
To date, data publication has mainly focused on static datasets,
managing their evolution through archiving [12]. Data publication
is more complex in the dynamic setting, where responsiveness is
usually a key requirement. Some suggest managing updates as data
streams, publishing changes as they happen [5]. Similarly, privacy
in streams introduces new challenges related to the data dynamics,
which may be used to infer private information.
This study investigates how to continuously publish data extracted
from private data streams containing user-related information to the
web of data in a privacy-preserving manner. Consider the following
example scenario: a company processes a private stream carrying
information from an IPTV platform containing viewership informa-
tion. The stream describes what users watch, registering when users
switch channels. The company enriches the stream with data from
private and public data sources, and wants to publish their analyses
in the web to showcase their analytic capabilities. The company
also wants to be compliant with privacy regulations and avoid scan-
dals like the ones mentioned above. It is worth noting that there
can be privacy leaks when only releasing statistics, since they may
highlight the behaviour of outliers which could be re-identified by
exploiting external knowledge.
As a solution, we propose SihlQL, a query language to perform
data analytic tasks over streams while preserving privacy. SihlQL
focuses on the creation of histograms (or distributions), as they
provide the foundation for many analytic queries in applications
such as data warehousing, OLAP and business analytics, as well
as plenty of machine learning algorithms such as decision tree
learners or naïve Bayes. SihlQL extends SPARQL to support the
processing of data streams and narrows SPARQL by introducing
constraints to guarantee that results are compliant with differential
privacy. As such, the main contributions of this article are:
• SihlQL: a continuous SPARQL-based query language for RDF
streams that integrates differential privacy methods;
• a new differential privacy mechanism that extends the ex-
pressive power of w-event privacy [14] and its suitability for
SPARQL by strategically dropping histogram bins; and
• a SihlQL execution engine prototype built on top of Apache
Flink that rewrites SihlQL queries as Flink topologies.
Next, Section 2 describes related work and introduces the basic
notions of differential privacy and RDF stream processing. Section
3 presents the design of SihlQL, which is tailored to enable w-event
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privacy. Section 4 introduces our extension of w-event privacyÐthe
bin removal mechanismÐand integrates it to the w-event privacy
framework and SihlQL. Section 5 analyses SihlQLwith experiments
over two real-world data sets. Section 6 concludes the article with
final remarks and future work.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH
This section introduces differential privacy with a specific focus on
w-event privacy, which is one of the building blocks of this study.
Next, we review the main concepts of RDF stream processing and
privacy in the semantic web context.
Differential privacy. Differential privacy (DP) [10] introduces noise
in query answers to protect the presence of users in the dataset
without significantly changing the result. Central to DP is the notion
of neighbouring datasets: two datasets are neighbours if they differ
in one record. Given two neighbouring datasetsD andD ′, a queryQ
(or mechanism), DP imposes plausible deniability for each possible
answer E by comparing the probability P that the answer can be
found when running the query on D and D ′ against a threshold eϵ ,
i.e.
P (Q(D) ∈ E) ≤ eϵ · P(Q(D ′) ∈ E) + δ . (1)
ϵ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0 are two parameters that regulate the differen-
tial privacy mechanisms. ϵ is called privacy budget (shortly bud-
get) and trades off utility and privacy. When δ = 0, we have ϵ-
indistinguishability, i.e. the ratio between the two probabilities in
Eq. 1 is bound by eϵ . This is an ideal case since it guarantees that
any output produced by Q(D) is likely to be generated by eval-
uating Q on every neighbour dataset D ′. Without this property,
there are outputs from Q(D) which are more (or less) likely to be
generated by Q on some neighbour dataset D ′. When δ > 0, there
is a probability 1− δ that the output ofQ is not ϵ-indistinguishable.
DP is implemented through mechanisms that execute the query
Q and add some noise to the result. Such noise is usually sampled
from a Laplace distribution, calibrated to ϵ such that Eq. 1 holds.
This led to the development of a large set of mechanisms for op-
erations ranging from simple (e.g., sum and count [10]) to more
complex (e.g. deep learning [1]). Looking at interfaces for differen-
tially private querying, McSherry proposes PINQ [19], an extension
for Microsoft LINQ for DP. PINQ is a programmable API inspired
by SQL to let the user specify how to process data stored in static
datasets.
Data streams are different than static databases. Streams contain
continuous updates, hence query answers also become continuous.
The introduction of streams requires a definition of neighbouring
streams (rather than databases).
In [9], Dwork introduces event- and user-level privacy. Event-
level privacy defines two streams as neighbours if they differ in
one stream item. Event-level privacy is a straightforward exten-
sion of neighbour datasets and led to the creation of mechanisms
for computing different types of queries, such as count and his-
tograms [6, 9]. The main drawback is that ensuring plausible de-
niability w.r.t. streams changing in only one item exposes privacy
leaks in cases where such streams contain multiple stream items de-
scribing the same subject, such as financial transactions or location
streams. User-level privacy overcomes this drawback by defining
two streams as neighbours if they differ for one user (or object to
be protected). An issue with this definition is that it may require a
high injection of noise in the query results, destroying the utility
of the answers. This is because two neighbour streams can be com-
pletely different. E.g., if a stream contains only one user, the empty
stream would be a neighbour, and it requires high noise injection to
make the answers over them indistinguishable. To the best of our
knowledge, SihlQL is the first declarative query language proposed
for differentially private queries on streams.
w-event privacy. Kellaris et al. propose w-event privacy [14] to
overcome the limitations of the event- and user-level privacy. It
defines two streams as neighbours if they differ at most by one item
in a window of sizew which slides along the stream, and guarantees
that no window uses more budget than ϵ .
Let D = (D1,D2, . . .) be a stream of datasets. Each dataset Di
contains tuples (s,a), where s is the sensitive value to be protected
(e.g., user identities) and a is the value to analyse (e.g., TV channels);
two tuples in Di cannot share the value s , and s can appear in
multiple datasets of D. The task to be executed is represented
by a query Q that processes each individual dataset Di in D and
outputs an answer oi, which is appended to the output stream
(o1, o2, . . . , oi, . . .).
Kellaris et al. propose different algorithms and variations. In this
study, we focus on the Budget Distribution (BD) scheme, but our
contribution can also be applied to the other schemes they propose.
In the beginning, BD allocates a budget ϵ/w for the processing of
every dataset in D, ensuring that inw consecutive evaluations the
maximum budget used is ϵ . The idea of the BD scheme is that the
output stream may contain empty (or null) answers: the current
oi can be skipped (i.e., can be null) when it does not significantly
differ from the last non-null output ol. When an answer is null,
the budget can also be saved to process the next dataset in the
stream. The application of BD to the i-th item of D is presented in
Algorithm 1. The execution ofQ on Di produces as answer a vector
of values ci (Line 1). Next, BD computes the difference between
ci and the last non-null output ol, adds to it noise drawn from a
Laplacian distribution and stores it in a variable dis (Lines 3-4). This
step uses half of the privacy budget ϵ allocated for the processing
of Di (i.e. ϵ/(2 ·w)), as shown in Line 3. dis is compared with λi ,2
(Line 7) to determine if oi should be null or not. λi ,2 is half of the
remaining budget ϵrm (Line 6), which is computed by subtracting
from ϵ/2 the budget used in the previousw iterations (Line 5). If dis
is greater than λi ,2, noise is added to ci (calibrated by λi ,2) and the
algorithm releases a new answer, paying a price of ϵrm/2 (Line 7).
Otherwise, the privacy budget is preserved, the algorithm returns a
null answer and the data analyst will assume that the last non-null
release ol is a good approximation of oi.
w-event privacy is one of the most sophisticated state of the art
solutions to enable DP in stream processing. Compared to simpler
alternatives, this framework usually achieves better utility by using
the same amount of privacy budget. w-event privacy is presented as
a set of algorithms, but the authors do not propose a query language
on top of it. SihlQL is, therefore, the first declarative query language
built on top of this framework. This version of SihlQL focuses on a
specific operationÐhistogram computationÐbut it can be extended
to integrate a wider set of operators based on w-event privacy.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of the w-event privacy BD scheme [14]
1: ci ← Q(Di )
2: Identify the last non-null release ol from (o1, o2, . . . , oi−1)
3: dis ← 1
d
∑d
j=1 |ol[j] − ci[j]|; λi ,1 ← (2 ·w)/(ϵ · d)
4: dis ← dis + Lap(λi ,1)
5: ϵrm ← ϵ/2 −
∑i−1
k=i−w+1 ϵk ,2
6: λi ,2 ← 2/ϵrm




8: else ϵi ,2 ← 0; return oi ← null
RDF stream processing. RDF stream processing studies how to ex-
tend the semantic web stack with models to capture streams and
process them [8]. An RDF stream S is a sequence of time-annotated
RDF graphs ((G1, t1), (G2, t2), . . .), where Gi denotes the i-th RDF
graph and ti is its temporal annotation. We assume that the tem-
poral annotation is a time instant, and that graphs are ordered by
time, e.g. as in [4, 16, 17]. For example, let STV be an RDF stream
containing information about which channels users are currently
watching. At time ti ,Gi reports on the current state of viewers with
RDF triples (u :isWatching c), where u and c are IRIs identifying
respectively users and channels.
Query languages for processing RDF streams are extensions of
SPARQL [13]. A SPARQL query is defined as a tuple (E,DS,QF ).
E is a SPARQL algebra expression, which is composed by com-
bining graph patterns through algebraic operators, e.g., joins (▷◁),
left joins ( ▷◁), unions (∪), and groups (γ ). Let I be the set of IRIs;
DS = {(de f ,G), (u1,G1), . . . , (uk ,Gk )} denotes an RDF dataset,
where de f identifies the default RDF graphG , and ui ∈ I (i ≤ k) de-
notes the named graphGi . A dataset contains one default graph and
zero or more named graphs, i.e. k ≥ 0. QF is a query form among
SELECT, CONSTRUCT, ASK and DESCRIBE. To execute a SPARQL
query, algebra operators are replaced by physical operators that
implement the evaluation semantics of the relative operators. Phys-
ical operators consume and generate bags Ω of solution mappings
µÐpartial functions associating variables to RDF terms (the set of
IRIs, literals and blank nodes). For example, the SPARQL query in
Listing 1 computes histograms by processing data from a graph
GTV . The query can be represented as:
q = (E = γ?channel ,COU NT (∗)(BGP),
DS = {(de f , :GTV )},
QF = SELECT).
E describes a sequence of two operations: (1) a basic graph pattern
(Line 4) produces solution mappings µ that associate two variables
?user and ?channel to RDF terms and (2) a grouping operator cre-
ates groups of mappings sharing the same ?channel values (Line 5),
and computes the size of each group (Line 3). Continuous extensions
of SPARQL exploit time annotations to perform operations over
streams, including window-based operations (e.g. C-SPARQL [4]
and CQELS [16]) and event pattern matching (e.g. EP-SPARQL [2]
and DOTR [17]). They are built by extending DS to include streams
(in addition to graphs), and the set of operators to compose E with
stream-related operators [7]. Moreover, they extend the evaluation
semantics to move from one-time to continuous. The result of those
1 PREFIX : <http://example.com/>
2 FROM :GTV
3 SELECT ?channel (COUNT(∗) AS ?viewers)
4 WHERE{ ?user :isWatching ?channel }
5 GROUP BY ?channel
Listing 1: Histogram computation in SPARQL
continuous query evaluations is a stream which contains the an-
swers that are computed over time. These solutions focused on
creating languages with a large number of operations, to fulfil a
large number of tasks. In this study, we take a different perspective
focusing on the definition of a differentially private language for
processing RDF streams. Intuitively, there are queries which are in-
trinsically harder than others to protect. For example, select-project-
join queries reveal more information about the underlying data
than aggregation queries and are, consequently, harder to protect.
Therefore, a differentially-private query language may sacrifice
expressive power for the sake of preserving privacy.
Privacy in the semantic web. Kirrane et al. [15] provide an overview
of the problems and solutions of privacy, security and associated
policies in the context of the semantic web technologies. Whilst
they found various papers tackling the issue of privacy and we are
aware of some papers exploring the adaption of DP in the static
case [23], to the best of our knowledge no publication considered
the application of differential privacy to semantic web data streams.
3 A QUERY LANGUAGE FORW-EVENT
PRIVACY
In this section, we introduce SihlQL, a query language relaying on
and extending the notion of w-event privacy. We first present a set
of constraints derived from w-event privacy and then we describe
how SPARQL can be extended to fulfil them.
3.1 w-event privacy constraints
Defining a SPARQL-based query language for processing RDF
streams while preserving w-event privacy requires to take into
account the constraints the latter introduces. Looking at the input
data, w-event privacy assumes that: (C1) there is one input stream,
(C2) each stream item contains all the data required to compute
the relative answer, and (C3) in each stream item, the value to be
protected appears at most in one tuple.
In addition, w-event privacy imposes two assumptions on the
parameter d (Line 3 in Algorithm 1), which describes the number
of answer groups (e.g. bins) returned: (C4) d is a constant deter-
mined ex-ante during query definition time, and (C5) at each time
instant, the size of ci is d . In the task we want to achieveÐhistogram
computationÐd is the number of bins to be computed.
3.2 Dataset
Constraints C1, C2, and C3 drive the modelling of the SihlQL
dataset. A SihlQL dataset is composed by one RDF stream S and
zero or more named RDF graphs G, i.e.:
DSSihlQL = {(de f ,S), (u1,G1), . . . , (uk ,Gk )},k ≥ 0,
where de f denotes the data stream and ui ∈ I the named graphs
(i ≤ k). The SihlQL dataset intrinsically satisfies C1. S takes the
role of the default graph in SPARQL and it captures the idea that
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the default data source to be processed by SihlQL is the stream.
Comparing SihlQL with other query languages for RDF streams, it
differs from CQELS, since CQELS sets streams as named elements.
SihlQL is similar to C-SPARQL, where all the input streams are
merged into a default stream. This is a viable solution also in SihlQL,
but introduces the need to assess that C3 holds after the merge.
C2 requires that the stream conforms to the CQL’s RStream
definition [3]: each stream item reports a description of the events
happening at the relative time instant. We keep this assumption
for the sake of clarity, but it can be relaxed to include streams with
events annotated with the start and end time instants.
C3 also implies that one knows ex-ante which part of the data
is sensitive. Hence, we assume that the query is submitted by a
reliable user such as the data curator. A possible way to overcome
this limitation is to annotate the data to describe its level of privacy.
For example, if the query contains the triple pattern at Line 3 of
Listing 1 and the domain of :isWatchinд is declared as sensitive,
queries which projects or groups ?user will be rejected. This can
be implemented by designing meta-level annotations over the data
schema, similar to the approach that Zhao et al. propose to describe
data dynamics [26].
3.3 Algebra operators
SihlQL supports the usual algebra operators of SPARQL [13]: se-
lection, projection, join, left join, grouping and aggregations, in
addition to basic graph patterns and GRAPH clauses. Differently
from other extensions for querying streams, SihlQL does not in-
troduce new operators. Using stream item-aggregator operators
like sliding windows may affect the privacy of the answer since the
data from the same stream item would be processed multiple times.
This causes a potential loss of w-event privacy guarantees. Having
sliding windows may also break the condition C3 when a window
captures two stream items containing the same sensitive value.
In addition, to preserve the conditions C4 and C5 set by w-event
privacy, SihlQL limits the way onwhich ESihlQL (i.e. the algebra ex-
pressions) can be composed. C5 sets the number of bins as constant
over time. This happens when either the stream has information
about empty bins or the bin set is available from some background
data. When streams describe events, however, it often happens that
no information is available about entities not involved in them. E.g.
if no one is watching the TV channel c , c will not appear in STV .
Having information about the bins stored in some background data
is a common use case, and it follows that SihlQL should support
the join of static background data and the input stream. This join
must be a left join to ensure that empty bins are contained in the
result. An inner join would not produce empty bins. For example,
if at time t a channel c has no viewers, the relative stream item will
not contain any triple describing it, and the inner join will produce
zero solution mappings about c .
It follows that the SihlQLWHERE clause should contain aGRAPH
and an OPTIONAL clause as in Listing 2: channels are loaded from
background data :Gchannels and the combination between stream-
ing and background data is regulated by an OPTIONAL clause. This
is a minimal structure, and SihlQL queries support more complex
WHERE clauses, where graph patterns can be added to enrich, filter
or extend the solution mappings. For example, it is possible to put
1 PREFIX : <http://example.com/>
2 ENABLE PRIVACY EPSILON 0.1W 3
3 SELECT ?channel (COUNT(∗) AS ?viewers)
4 FROM STREAM :STV
5 FROM STATIC :Gchannels
6 WHERE {
7 OPTIONAL { ?user :isWatching ?channel }
8 GRAPH :Gchannels { ?channel a :TVChannel }
9 } GROUP BY ?channel
Listing 2: Histogram computation in SihlQL
conditions to select only the English-speaking TV channels or to
compute histograms of viewers with age between 18 and 35.
Note that the required OPTIONAL clause is a strong limitation
when defining queries. In Section 4 we introduce an extension
to the notion of w-event privacy, which allows us to relax this
constraint of fixed bin set size and consequently remove the need
of the OPTIONAL and GRAPH clauses.
It is worth mentioning that even if some constraints can be
checked at query compile time (e.g. the presence of OPTIONAL and
GRAPH clause), other constraints, such as C3 or C5, cannot and
can be only detected at evaluation time.
3.4 Evaluation semantics and query forms.
The continuous and instantaneous evaluation semantics define
respectively when and how the query is evaluated [7]. We designed
SihlQL to compute a new output every time new data is available
on the input stream. Therefore, there is an instantaneous evaluation
at each time instant ti such that (Gi , ti ) is a stream item of S. This
makes the SihlQL continuous evaluation semantics ideal to process
one stream item at a time, similarly to CQELS and EP-SPARQL
semantics.
The instantaneous semantics of SihlQL is analogous to SPARQL’s.




= {(de f ,Gi ), (uk ,Gk )} where (Gi , ti ) is an item of
the input stream S and k >= 0. Hence, a SPARQL dataset is
built by setting the stream item associated to the evaluation time
instant as default graph. Since SihlQL does not introduce new
operators and it supports SELECT and CONSTRUCT as query




The instantaneous evaluation of a SELECT query produces solu-
tion bindings, while the instantaneous evaluation of CONSTRUCT
queries produce RDF graphs. Instantaneous answers are annotated
with the evaluation time instant and become items of the output
stream: a stream of time-annotated bindings in case of SELECT
queries and an RDF stream in case of CONSTRUCT queries.
3.5 Privacy considerations
To complete the description of SihlQL, we need to introduce the
privacy aspects. In Section 2 we explained that w-event privacy
requires two parameters, ϵ and w . SihlQL introduces a PRIVACY
clause to enable privacy and to set such parameters. An example
is at Line 2 in Listing 2, where ENABLE PRIVACY indicates that
the query should consider differential privacy. The second part of
the clause declares that ϵ = 0.1 and w = 3. This design choice
to let the user set the privacy parameters is similar to the one in
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PINQ [19], and it assumes that the query writer is a trusted user
and will set fair parameter values. Additionally, the system could
set a maximum privacy budget ϵmax , and when registered queries
use all the budget, no more queries are accepted.
w-event privacy is implemented as a physical operator that can
be used when the query compiles the algebra expression. This
physical operator implements Algorithm 1 and performs a left join
between two sets of mappings, it groups and aggregates them. In
other words, it implements an algorithm that evaluates
γ?bin,COU NT (∗)(Ωb ▷◁?bin Ωh ), (2)
where Ωb is the set of solution mappings including the list of bins,
Ωh is the set of solution mappings with the data to compute the
bin heights, and ?bin is the common variable between mappings
of Ωb and Ωh . Taking as an example the query in Listing 2, Ωb
and Ωh are the bags produced by the evaluation of the GRAPH and
OPTIONAL clauses (Lines 8 and 7 resp.), and the common variable
between the mappings of the two bags is ?channel .
4 EXTENDING SIHLQL EXPRESSIVENESS
The main limitation of the query language we designed in Section 3
is the relation between the w-event privacy algorithm and the alge-
bra expression it implements (Eq. 2). It implies a set of constraints
on both the data and the algebra expression that the query must
satisfy to ensure that the privacy-preserving computation occurs
(correctly). We observe that Eq. 2 is a direct consequence of the
constraints C4 and C5: the list of bins should be known a priori,
and every bin must appear in every non-null answer of the output.
The major obstacle to relaxing these constraints relates to the
empty bins: the privacy-preserving evaluation of the histograms
adds noise to every bin (Line 7 in Algorithm 1) independently of
its size. If we replace the left join in Eq. 2 with
γ?bin,COU NT (∗)(Ωb ▷◁?bin Ωh ) (3)
then the solution will contain only non-empty bins, potentially
leading to privacy leaks. For example, if the query isolates one
user of STV then the result would contain only one non-empty TV
channel bin and evaluating Eq. 3 would unveil which channel the
user is watching, even if the bin height is obfuscated with noise.
Eq. 2 avoids this situation by always returning all bins, whose
magnitude is obfuscated with noise. Hence, it is hard to distinguish
between empty bins and bins with one user. In this section, we
introduce an original extension of w-event privacy that addresses
this issue via a bin-removal mechanism.
4.1 The bin removal mechanism.
Our intuition to overcome this issue is to remove both empty and
almost empty bins. As a consequence, malicious data analysts would
not know if bins are missing because they are empty or almost
empty. Setting a threshold hth such that bins containing less than
hth entries are automatically removed would not solve the problem,
as it would allow exploiting such information to violate privacy
when the threshold is set to 0. We therefore design the bin removal
mechanism R, defined as follows.
Definition 4.1. Let R be a mechanism that takes as an input a
bin height and returns a boolean value: true to keep the bin or false
to remove it. The output is a sample from a Bernoulli distribution
Be(p), where p is defined as
p =
1
1 + e−k (ϵ )·(h−h0)
, (4)
having k(ϵ) defined as a function proportional to ϵ .
R is a stochastic process: the fewer elements a bin contains,
the higher the probability that it is removed. This behaviour can
be modelled with a Bernoulli distribution, where the argument
p is computed via a logistic functionÐa sigmoid function with
parameters to control the maximum value, the steepness, and the
mid-value position of the curve. The probability p that a bin of
height h is kept is 1
1+e−k ·(h−h0)
, where h0 ≥ 0 is the height which
sets the probability to 0.5 and k ≥ 0 is the steepness of the curve. k
impacts the privacy: the higher this value, the higher the steepness,
making it easier to infer the actual bin height. We, therefore, relate
k to the privacy budget ϵ by setting the former as a function of the
latter. As the privacy budget decreases, the steepness of the curve
decreases and the removal probability of a bin containing h items
is closer to the removal probability of the neighbouring bins (i.e.
containing h ± 1 items), leading to more privacy. Therefore, k(ϵ)
must be proportional to ϵ .
The following theorem defines the DP guarantees of R.
Theorem 1. R is (ϵ ,δ )-differentially private, having δ defined as:
δ = max {0,d(x̄)} , (5)
where
d(x̄) = 1
1 + e−k (ϵ )·(x̄−h0)
− e
ϵ
1 + e−k (ϵ )·(x̄−1−h0)
. (6)








r2 − 4 · s · q
2 · s ) (7)
where
s = ek (ϵ )·h0 · (eϵ+k (ϵ ) − 1) (8)
r = k(ϵ) · e2·k (ϵ )·h0+k (ϵ ) · (eϵ − 1) (9)
q = e3·k (ϵ )·h0+k (ϵ ) · (eϵ − ek (ϵ )) (10)
Proof. Let b1 and b2 be two neighbouring bins with x and y
items, i.e. |y − x | = 1. Differential privacy imposes plausible deni-
ability for every possible outcome: the probabilities that R keeps
b1 and b2 must be close, as well as the probabilities that R removes
them. Following the definition of (ϵ, δ )-DP in Eq. 1, the two cases
are respectively formally modelled as
P(R(b1) = kept) ≤ eϵ · P(R(b2) = kept) + δ (11)
P(R(b1) = ¬kept) ≤ eϵ · P(R(b2) = ¬kept) + δ . (12)
We first study Eq. 11, which can be rewritten as:
1
1 + e−k (ϵ )·(x−h0)
≤ e
ϵ
1 + e−k (ϵ )·(y−h0)
+ δ . (13)







tively. When b2 is larger than b1, i.e. y = x + 1, fb1 (x) and fb2 (y)
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never intersect. We can show this by rewriting Eq. 13 with δ = 0
and y = x + 1:
e−k (ϵ )·x−k(ϵ )+k (ϵ )·h0 − eϵ−k (ϵ )·x+k (ϵ )·h0 ≤ eϵ − 1 (14)
e−k (ϵ )+k (ϵ )·h0 − eϵ+k (ϵ )·h0
ek (ϵ )·x
≤ eϵ − 1 (15)
e−k (ϵ )+k (ϵ )·h0 − eϵ+k (ϵ )·h0
eϵ − 1 ≤ e
k (ϵ )·x (16)
Eq. 16 holds when ϵ,k(ϵ) > 0. The right term is positive; while
the left one is negative: the numerator is negative (ϵ and k(ϵ) are
positive, so eϵ+k (ϵ )·h0 > e−k (ϵ )+k (ϵ )·h0 ) and the denominator is
positive.
When b2 is smaller than b1, i.e. y = x − 1, fb1 (x) and fb2 (x − 1)
may or may not intersect. When the two functions intersect, there
is an area where fb1 (x) is bigger than fb2 (y). We need to set δ to a
value that let the two logistic functions touch in exactly one point
to avoid such area, and consequently let Eq. 13 hold.
Formally, let d(x) be the function fb1 (x) − fb2 (x − 1). The maxi-
mum value of d(x) is negative when fb1 (x) and fb2 (x − 1) do not in-
tersect; 0 or positive otherwise. It follows thatδ = max {0,max {d(x)}}.




k(ϵ) · e−k (ϵ )·(x−h0)
(1 + e−k (ϵ )·(x−h0))2
− k(ϵ) · e
ϵ−k (ϵ )·(x−1−h0)
(1 + e−k (ϵ )·(x−1−h0))2
= 0 (17)
By expanding this equation, we obtain:
eϵ−k (ϵ )·x+k (ϵ )+k(ϵ )·h0 − e−k (ϵ )·x+k (ϵ )·h0+
k(ϵ) · (eϵ−2·k (ϵ )·x+k (ϵ )+2·k (ϵ )·h0 − e−2·k (ϵ )·x+k (ϵ )+2·k (ϵ )·h0 )+
eϵ−3·k (ϵ )·x+k (ϵ )+3·k (ϵ )·h0 − e−3·k (ϵ )·x+2·k (ϵ )+3·k (ϵ )·h0 = 0
By multiplying both sides for e3·k (ϵ )·x , we obtain:
s · e2·k (ϵ )·x + r · ek (ϵ )·x + q = 0
where s , r and q are defined as in Eq. 8, 9 and 10. We can replace
ek (ϵ )·x with a variable x̂ , resulting in a second grade equation:




r2 − 4 · s · q
2 · s . (18)
Since x̂ = ek (ϵ )·x , it follows that x = 1
k (ϵ ) · ln (x̂). We can observe
that s and r are non-negative since ϵ,k(ϵ) > 0, i.e. − r
2s is negative.
q is 0 or negative when ϵ ≥ k(ϵ), positive otherwise. That means x̂
does not exist when q is big enough to let ∆ = r2−4 ·s ·q be negative,
i.e. fb1 (x) and fb2 (x − 1) do not intersect and d(x) is monotonically
decreasing. When q has a value such that x̂ admits solutions, x̂ has
at least one negative or 0 solution, given by −r−
√
∆
2·s . The sign of the
other solution of x̂ , i.e. −r+
√
∆
2·s can be either positive (when r < ∆),
0 (when r = ∆), or negative (when r > ∆). We are interested in the
latter case, which guarantees the existence of x̄ . That means, the






To summarise, d(x̄) is the maximum value of d(x). When d(x̄)
is positive, by setting δ = d(x̄) we guarantee that the two logistic
functions fb1 (x) and fb2 (x−1) do not intersect, i.e., Eq. 13 is satisfied.
We reach the same result by studying Eq. 12. We can replace
P(R(b) = ¬kept) with 1 − P(R(b1) = kept), which leads to the
inequality:
e−k (ϵ )·(x−h0)
1 + e−k (ϵ )·(x−h0)
≤ e
ϵ−k (ϵ )·(y−h0)
1 + e−k (ϵ )·(y−h0)
+ δ (19)
Repeating the analysis we did for Eq. 11, we show that the logis-
tic functions never intersect when y = x − 1, while they may






. By solving ∂dr
∂x






2·sr ), where sr = e
k (ϵ )·h0 · (eϵ−k (ϵ ) − 1), rr =
k(ϵ) ·e2·k(ϵ )·h0−k (ϵ ) · (eϵ − 1) and qr = e3·k (ϵ )·h0−k (ϵ ) · (eϵ −e−k (ϵ )).
In this case, rr and qr are positive while sr is negative.
Finally, we observe that d(x̄) = dr (x̄r ). Since d and dr are sym-
metric over the axis passing in h0, the two functions have the same






= 0, respectively. □
Theorem 1 shows that the bin removal mechanism is (ϵ, δ )-
differentially private. Since there are several scenarios where data
curators prefer to have δ equal to zero, in the following theorem
we define a set of conditions which guarantee (ϵ, 0)-differential
privacy.
Theorem 2. R is (ϵ ,0)-differentially private when ϵ ≥ k(ϵ)
Proof. We focus the analysis on Eq. 11. As explained in the
proof of Theorem 1, the case where the two logistic functions may
intersect is the one where b2 is smaller than b1, i.e. y = x − 1. By
setting δ = 0, we can rewrite Eq. 13 as:
1 + ek (ϵ )−k (ϵ )·(x−h0) − eϵ − eϵ−k (ϵ )·(x−h0) ≤ 0. (20)
Since eϵ ≥ 1, 1 − eϵ is negative or null. Therefore, the solutions of
ek (ϵ )−k (ϵ )·(x−h0) − eϵ−k (ϵ )·(x−h0) ≤ 0 (21)
supply a sufficient condition for (ϵ, 0)-differential privacy. Eq. 21
holds when k(ϵ) ≤ ϵ . We reach the same conclusion by studying
the other possible outcome of R, i.e. Eq. 12. The analysis of Eq. 19
develops as the one of Eq. 13. □
One of the main results of Theorem 2 is that when ϵ is small and
δ = 0, k(ϵ) is small as well, i.e. the logistic function controlling the
removal probability is slight. It is also worth noting that there are
values of k(ϵ) > ϵ which lead to (ϵ, 0)-differential privacy, since Eq.
21 is stricter than Eq. 20.
Finally, we set a few conditions to determine the value of h0.
Ideally, we want h0 as small as possible, to reduce the number of
removed bins. At the same time, we want that P(R(b) = kept) is
close to 0 when the height of the bin b is close to 0. It follows that
h0 can be calculated by finding the minimum value of h0 such that
1/(1 + ek (ϵ )·h0 ) ≤ z, where z is the probability that R does not
remove an empty bin. It is worth noting that when z = 0, h0 = ∞,
since 0 is one of the asymptotes of the logistic function we defined.
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Algorithm 2 Pseudocode of BDbr for histogram queries
1: di ← Q(Di )
2: for all (b,h) ∈ di do Add (b,h) to ci with probability 1/(1 +
e−k (ϵ/(3·w ))·(h−h0))
3: d ← |ci |; dis ← 1d
∑
(b ,h)∈ci |last[b] −h |; λi ,1 ← (3 ·w)/(ϵ ·d)
4: dis ← dis + Lap(λi ,1)
5: ϵrm ← ϵ/3 −
∑i−1
k=i−w+1 ϵk ,2
6: λi ,2 = 2/ϵrm
7: if dis > λi ,2 then ϵi ,2 ← ϵrm ;
8: for all (b,h) ∈ (ci) do last[b] = oi[b] ← h + Lap(λi ,2)
9: else ϵi ,2 ← 0; oi ← null
10: return oi
4.2 BDbr : w-event privacy with bin removal
Theorem 1 shows that the bin removal approach is ϵ-differentially
private. The next step is to develop an extension of the BD scheme
for w-event privacy to handle bin removal.
Algorithm 2 shows BDbr , the w-event privacy mechanism for
computing histograms with bin removal, at the i-th iteration. Ini-
tially, the query is evaluated and all the non-empty bins (b,h) (where
b is the bin identifier, and h is the bin height) are stored in di. Next,
the algorithm computes a subset ci ⊆ di by applying the bin re-
moval mechanism described above (Line 2). The d parameter now
can vary among evaluations and is set as the size of ci. Since the
output will contain all the bins in ci,d does not reveal any additional
information to the data analyst about di.
The algorithm uses a data structure last to store the last non-
null entry numbers released for every bin observed in the past.
This data structure is used to compute the mean absolute error
dis (Line 3). If last does not contain any information about a bin
b, last[b] is set to 0 (as in the first iterations of Algorithm 1, when
there are only null outputs). The value of dis is used to determine
if the current iteration should produce a non-null release (Line 8).
A significant difference between BD and BDbr is how the privacy
budget is distributed. BD uses half of the budget to add noise to dis
and part of the other half to obfuscate ci. BDbr allocates budget
also to the bin removal mechanism: it equally distributes a third
of the budget to the three privacy mechanisms it embeds. As in
BD, the budget for obfuscating the non-null answers can be moved
across datasets.
4.3 BDbr in SihlQL
We can now use BDbr to build a physical operator to evaluate
γ?bin,COU NT (∗)(Ωh ), where Ωh is the set of mappings containing
the data to compute histograms. Since BDbr implements one al-
gebra operator, it follows that it can be used to also evaluate the
algebra expressions in Eq. 3 as well as other sub-expressions which
lead to a bag Ωh compliant with C1, C2, and C3. BDbr relaxes con-
ditions C4 and C5, allowing to output histograms with a dynamic
number of bins. As a consequence, the OPTIONAL and GRAPH
clauses in Lines 7 and 8 of Listing 2 are not mandatory anymore and
can be omitted. Hence, BDbr extends the set of privacy-preserving
queries that can be expressed in SihlQL.
In the next section, we investigate how Algorithm 2 )differs from
Algorithm 1 in terms of utility (or accuracy, as controlled by ϵ and
w) of query results. Note that we do not run a traditional empirical
evaluation of our contributions, as the privacy guarantees of our
new mechanismÐthe main contribution of this paperÐis already
established by proofs provided in this section.
5 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
The main goal of this section is to provide insights about the bin
removal mechanism in practice. We first analyse the bin removal
mechanism alone and how different parameters affect it, and then
we study its impact when integrated into SihlQL.
5.1 Analysis of the bin removal parameters
Our first analysis focuses on the bin removal mechanism and on the
effect that the parametersk(ϵ), ϵ , δ and z have on it. Figure 1a shows
the value of h0 for different values of z and k(ϵ). We observe that
the higher the value of k(ϵ), the less z influences h0: when k(ϵ) ≥ 1,
h0 is having small variations (i.e. the shift of the probability curve
is smaller). Hence, the lower k(ϵ), which regulates the steepness
of the logistic function (and consequently the probabilities used
in the Bernoulli distribution), the higher the influence of z, which
entails the probability of removing an empty bin), on h0. Figure 1b
exemplifies the effect of z when k(ϵ) is fixed: the probability curve
shifts to the right as z decreases. Hence, when the probability of
removing an empty bin (i.e., z) decreases, the bigger the size of a
bin that has a 50% chance of removal.
Figure 1c shows the effect of k(ϵ) on the probability curve. As
explained above, k(ϵ) affects the steepness of the curve. While for
very small values of k(ϵ) (i.e. k(ϵ) < 0.1) the growth of the curve is
very smooth, when k(ϵ) ≥ 0.1 the curve starts to become steeper,
resembling the step function. The fact that for relatively small
values of k(ϵ) the curve is steep indicates that the logistic function
is a good choice to represent the bin removal probability.
The heat-maps in Figures 1d, 1e and 1f show how delta varies for
different values of k(ϵ) and ϵ . The green area identifies the values
for which the bin removal mechanism is (ϵ, 0)-differentially private.
The dashed line is the function k(ϵ) = ϵ , which we determined
as sufficient condition for (ϵ, 0)-differential privacy in Theorem 2.
Figure 1b shows that when ϵ ≥ 1, the line is a good approximation
of the maximum value of k(ϵ) that ensure δ = 0. The heat-map
also shows that the value of δ increases quickly as the difference
between k(ϵ) and ϵ increases.
Figure 1c and 1d focus on values of ϵ ≤ 1: they show that in this
area, there are values ofk(ϵ) > ϵ where δ = 0. This happens because
the area of (ϵ, 0)-differential privacy is defined by Eq. 20, while
Theorem 2 is based on Eq. 21, which is a stricter approximation.
Hence, for small values of ϵ , a user may want to find a maximum
value of k(ϵ) such that δ = 0 in order to increase the steepness of
the logistic curve and gain some utility.
In conclusion, we observe that when histograms have large bin
sizes (in the order of hundreds of entries) our mechanism is unlikely
to remove many bins. When bins have small sizes, the mechanism
is likely to remove those and for very small sizes some hand-tuning
of k(ϵ) parameters might be helpful. Depending on the use case,
user may also decide to increase the value of δ to gain utility.
WWW ’20, April 20ś24, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan Daniele Dell’Aglio and Abraham Bernstein
Figure 1: (a) effect of z onh0; (b) effect of z on the bin removal
probability (k(ϵ) = 0.1); (c) effect of k(ϵ) on the bin removal
curves; (d-f) values of δ for combinations of ϵ and k(ϵ).
5.2 Bin removal mechanism impact on SihlQL
In this section, we empirically illustrate the impact that the bin
removal mechanism has on w-event privacy and SihlQL. We ex-
plained that the new mechanism increases the expressiveness of
SihlQL. Intuitively, the price to pay for such expressiveness is a re-
duction of utility: we expect that results produced by BD are better
than the ones produced by BDbr . The rationale for this expectation
is that BDbr introduces a third privacy mechanism, requiring to
split the available budget in three parts rather than two, leading to
a higher amount of noise injected by each mechanism.
5.2.1 Data, queries and parameters. For our analysis, we consider
two real-world datasets. The IPTV dataset contains a selection of
viewership data from an IPTV platform. It covers a time period of
about 12 hours and contains 49,035 distinct timestamps with more
than 950 million events. The stream describes 450 channels, which
are also stored in an RDF graph to be used as background data.
We use two queries: to study BD, we use the query in Listing 2;
to study BDbr , we run a query without channel graph and with
the WHERE clause composed by one BGP to extract what users
watch (the BGP inside the OPTIONAL clause in Line 7 of Listing 2).
Hence, the queries build histograms with channels as bins and the
number of current viewers as bin size.
The second dataset contains reviews data from Amazon [18]. We
extracted a stream with 758,745 events in 1,266 stream items, which
cover a period from 26 January 2002 to 23 July 2014. The stream
contains 112 products. We run two queries analogous to the ones
of the IPTV case, which count the number of reviews per product.
We consider four values for the budget parameter ϵ = {0.1, 0.5, 1, 5}
and four values for the parameter w = {1, 5, 10, 100}. In settings
where DP is applied to static datasets, ϵ in the order of tens is usually
considered too high and assumed to lead to privacy leaks; values in
single digit are usually adopted by industries (e.g. [25]), and values
lower than 1 are associated to strong privacy. The presence of w
makes the calibration of ϵ even harder since it directly affects the
noise injected in the algorithms. In the BDbr experiments, we set
z = 10−2. We also set k(ϵ) = ϵ , i.e. δ = 0, to focus on the cases
where ϵ-indistinguishability must be guaranteed. Every experiment
considers one dataset, one query, and a specific value of ϵ and w .
We run every experiment twenty times.
5.2.2 The SihlQL engine. We developed a SihlQL engine prototype
to run experiments1. The prototype is built on top of Apache Jena
3.6.0 and Apache Flink 1.7.1. Jena parses the query, creates the al-
gebraic tree, and optimises it. The prototype replaces the algebraic
operators with physical operators, implemented as Flink functions.
The result of the compilation process is a topology, which can be
submitted to Flink for execution. When the SihlQL query contains
the PRIVACY clause, the prototype uses the physical operators im-
plementing BD and BDbr ; else it uses non-DP operators to compose
the topology. Currently supported SPARQL operators include BGP,
OPTIONAL, GRAPH, FILTER, GROUP BY, COUNT, and SUM.
We ran the experiments in a machine equipped with an Intel
i7-6600 CPU (2.60 GHz, four logical CPUs) and 16GB RAM, which
runs Ubuntu 19.04 with Oracle Java 1.8.0. Given that the main
focus of our analysis is the trade-off between answer quality and
expressiveness, we only report general time performance results.
The SihlQL engine was able to process the IPTV dataset (i.e. 950
million events) in ca. 11 minutes, including the time to load the
data (from a file stored in an external USB HDD storage) and store
the results in an InfluxDB instance running in a server located
in the institution local network. We noticed that the BDbr query
was executed faster than the BD one (ca. 1 minute faster): it is not
surprising since the former query processes only the items that
appear in the stream recently, while the latter processes all the
items at every new query evaluation. This suggests that the current
prototype can process large amounts of data reactively, even if
specific experiments are required to estimate accurate throughput
and latency values (which is out of the scope of this study).
Both BD and BDbr queries were faster than the query without
privacy, which was processed in ca. 14 minutes. This is due to the
fact that the two privacy-preserving queries drops data during the
execution, consequently increasing the time performance. In the
next subsections, we focus on analysing the quality of the answers.
1The prototype and the Amazon dataset used in the experiments are available at:
https://gitlab.ifi.uzh.ch/DDIS-Public/sihlql.
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Figure 2: Percentage of items for which the privatised time
series distances to the actual time series are indistinguish-
able for the Amazon dataset (a,e) and the IPTV dataset: all
(b,f), top 20 (c,g) and the bottom 20 (d,h) TV channels.
5.2.3 Analysis design. Directly comparing BD and BDbr is not
straightforward due to the fact that they execute different queries.
Hence, they produce results at different time instants and on a
different number of items. Therefore, we developed a comparison
strategy based on the distance (or error) of the results from the
original data as follows. For each item in the dataset, we computed
the actual answer, which can be represented as a time series where
values are the bin heights at different time points. Similarly, we can
represent the outcomes of BD and BDbr as two collections of time
series. We compare the two solutions by computing the distances
between the privatised noisy time series and the actual time series.
Since both BD and BDbr include mechanisms to reduce the
number of answers, the privatised time series have fewer time
points than the actual one. We considered two methods to impute
the missing points of the privatised time series: ARIMA [22] and
last observation carried forward (LOCF). ARIMA is a standard time-
series interpolation method. LOCF captures one of the basic ideas of
w-event privacy by assuming that the current value is equivalent to
the last non-null output. In our experiments, LOCF showed better
results, i.e. closer distances, than ARIMA; therefore, in the following,
we report the results obtained by imputing the missing points with
LOCF. Since the final goal is to have a good approximation of the
actual time series, we did not leverage sampling methods to reduce
their points.
We used the Euclidean distance as the distance measure. We did
not use other time series distances, such as DTW, because we know
that the time series are aligned over the time dimension. As usually
done in time series analysis, we applied z-normalisation before
imputing the missing points and computing the distances. Running
the experiments for each privacy approach (either BD or BDbr ),
item (product or channel, depending on dataset), ϵ , andw resulted
in 20 distances. To compare BD and BDbr , we test if the sets of
distances with the same item, ϵ , andw values are indistinguishable
(the null hypothesis H0) or not (the alternative hypothesis Ha ). We
employ the Mann-Whitney U test, a non-parametric test to assess
if the distributions of two populations are equal or not.
5.2.4 Hypothesis testing results. Figure 2 shows the test results
aggregated over ϵ andw . In each bar, the red area (at the top) shows
the percentage of items for which we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis of the Mann-Whitney U test, i.e. the distances between BD
and the original data are indistinguishable from the ones between
BDbr and the original values. Figures 2a and 2b show the results for
the Amazon and IPTV datasets aggregated over ϵ : the higher the
privacy (i.e. the smaller ϵ), the more indistinguishable the results
of the two privacy mechanisms. Figure 2e shows that w behaves
similarly to ϵ in the Amazon dataset: when noise increases (i.e.w
increases) the number of indistinguishable items increases as well.
However, we cannot identify the same trend in Figure 2f, related to
the IPTV dataset:w does not seem to affect the plotted ratio. This
could be motivated by the more variability in the average and the
maximum number of viewers per channel of the IPTV dataset.
To further investigate this, we analysed the behaviour of the 20
channels with the highest and the lowest median values of viewers,
depicted in Figure 2(c,g) and 2(d,h) respectively. The plots show
that for channels with a high number of viewers, BD and BDbr are
producing results with different distances to the actual values, while
for channels with a few viewers, it is the opposite. The same analysis
on the Amazon dataset shows similar results, even if the ratios are
less extreme than the IPTV case. This is because the number of
products, as well as the median of their reviews for products, are
smaller than the number of channels and their viewers.
This analysis partially confirms our initial intuition: when the
height of the items (i.e. the size of histogram bin) is high, or the
privacy-constraints are weak, BD and BDbr produce different re-
sults. However, when the height of the bins is small, and the pri-
vacy requirements strong, the two solutions produce similar results.
Hence, when we put high privacy requirements (i.e. ϵ ≤ 1) on
the publication of a data stream the utility of BDbr is comparable
to BD’s in 75% (respectively, 35% or 30%) of the casesÐa positive
results given that BDbr provides a higher expressiveness. The same
is sometimes true to a lesser degree with large window sizes.
We observed than when ϵ = 0.1, the BD execution for the Ama-
zon dataset did not produce any non-null answer forw ∈ {1, 10}.
The reason is that most of the items of this dataset have low val-
ues, and the condition at Line 7 of Algorithm 1 is never satisfied.
BDbr does not suffer the same problem since the computation of
dis considers only the items that have a height greater than 0 and
that are not removed by the bin removal mechanism. This suggests
that when the data has multiple bins with a low number of items,
BDbr may be a more suitable solution than BD.
5.2.5 Difference in distances. When BD and BDbr are statistically
indistinguishable, then BDbr higher expressiveness shows a clear
WWW ’20, April 20ś24, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan Daniele Dell’Aglio and Abraham Bernstein
advantage. This sub-section further investigates what happens,
when the two mechanisms are distinguishable, to understand fur-
ther trade-off when using the methods. Figure 3 graphs the differ-
ence between BDbr and BD distances to the actual data for the
IPTV dataset (for brevity, we omit the plot of the Amazon dataset,
which is very similar). For each (ϵ,w) pair, we build the plot using
the items that show distinguishable distances (i.e., rejected H0 in
the Mann-Whitney U test). Positive differences indicate that BD
outputs are closer to the actual time series than BDbr ; negative
differences indicate the opposite case. We use relative distances, i.e.
each distance is divided by the values of the actual time series2.
The figure shows that the differences between the distances vary
between -1 and 1. Even if in some cases the differences are large
(close to 1, i.e., we can observe a difference up to the size of the bin),
the figure shows that bins with large sizes, coloured blue, are in
most of the cases close to the zero (i.e. similar error), while the ones
with small size shift more. One reason for this behaviour is that the
amount of noise added to a bin depends on the privacy budget but
not on the actual bin size. Hence, smaller bins are more affected.
It is interesting to observe that for small values of ϵ andw , there
are several cases where BDbr outperforms BD. This is positive since
ϵ should be tuned to enforce strong privacy. When w increases,
the differences shift towards positive values, and BD outperforms
BDbr : whenw increases, the BDbr bin removal mechanism has less
budget and consequently filters out more items. This is especially
evident for channels with fewer than 100 viewers (i.e., items with
bins sizes h ≤ 100; white and red in the figure), which suggests
a decrease of the utility of BDbr related to w for small bin sizes.
BD also improves over BDbr also when ϵ increases. When privacy
is very weak (ϵ = 5), almost all the distances are positive. This is
because the BD mechanism that creates the noisy answers usually
has more budget available than the BDbr ’s, as BDbr constantly
invests a third of the budget in the removal mechanism.
To summarise, BDbr includes an additional privacy mechanism.
In addition to the advantages in terms of query expressiveness,
the analyses show that the way in which those three mechanisms
interact leads to benefits (sometimes even higher utility than BD),
despite of the less available budget each of them has. As future
research, we plan to further investigate these interactions and de-
velop more sophisticated budget assignment policies, which may
improve the performance of the solution.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The ability to exchange data and information is one of the pillars
of our digital society. Data analyses lead to the creation of new
knowledge, which in turn leads to innovation and ultimately to
increased welfare. This also holds for the studies involving sensitive
data, which are the key to explain to unlock the potential in a
multitude of domains ranging from clinical studies, behavioural
analyses, However, such analyses should be built keeping privacy
as a key priorityÐindeed some argue as a basic human rightÐto
avoid that sensitive information or secrets get leaked and misused.
In this article, we presented a semantic-web-based framework
that allows experts to analyse and publish sensitive data Specifically,
2As a reference: for our datasets, themechanisms’ outputs relative distance to the actual
time series varies between ca. 0 and 2 (for different privacy parameter combinations).
Figure 3: Difference of distances for distinguishable results.
we introduced SihlQL, which allows defining queries over data
streams such that answers have formal statistical guarantees against
privacy leaks. SihlQL builds on top of SPARQL and the w-event
differential privacy framework. To generalise SihlQL and improve
the set of queries that can be privatised, we extended w-event
privacy with a bin removal mechanism.We prove that our extension
BDbr satisfies differential privacy constraints and, hence, provides
statistical privacy guarantees. We also developed a prototype for
SihlQL and showed that it can process streams with millions of
events while privatising the query results.
Obviously, SihlQL can be improved. We aim to extend SihlQL
with stream-specific operators, e.g. sliding windows and event pat-
tern matching. This requires studying those operators’ privacy
implications, potentially rethinking how they work and how they
can leak information. Currently, SihlQL builds on two of the foun-
dational semantic web blocksÐRDF and SPARQLÐand we believe
that other technologies can play an important role. Ontology- and
constraint-languages, such as OWL and SHACL, would be ideal to
describe the privacy aspects related to data and schema, automating
privacy assessments over queries before and during their execution.
These explorations will help to make SihlQL more versatile.
As such, the presentation of SihlQL and its expressiveness en-
hancing BDbr mechanism is a step towards the exploration of
privacy-preserving techniques in the Web of Data. Given that
semantic web research has so far mostly focused on publishing
privacy-insensitive data, this is an important step for the field that
will hopefully pave the way to a privacy-preserving web of data.
Acknowledgements. We thank the Swiss National Science Founda-
tion for the partial support under contract number #407550_167177,
and Genistat AG for their help with the IPTV dataset.
REFERENCES
[1] Martín Abadi, Andy Chu, Ian J. Goodfellow, H. Brendan McMahan, Ilya Mironov,
Kunal Talwar, and Li Zhang. 2016. Deep Learning with Differential Privacy. In
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM, 308ś318.
Differentially Private Stream Processing for the Semantic Web WWW ’20, April 20ś24, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan
[2] Darko Anicic, Paul Fodor, Sebastian Rudolph, and Nenad Stojanovic. 2011. EP-
SPARQL: a unified language for event processing and stream reasoning. InWWW.
ACM, 635ś644.
[3] Arvind Arasu, Shivnath Babu, and Jennifer Widom. 2006. The CQL continuous
query language: semantic foundations and query execution. VLDB J. 15, 2 (2006),
121ś142.
[4] Davide Francesco Barbieri, Daniele Braga, Stefano Ceri, Emanuele Della Valle, and
Michael Grossniklaus. 2010. Querying RDF streams with C-SPARQL. SIGMOD
Record 39, 1 (2010), 20ś26.
[5] Davide Francesco Barbieri and Emanuele Della Valle. 2010. A Proposal for
Publishing Data Streams as Linked Data - A Position Paper. In LDOW, Vol. 628.
CEUR-WS.org.
[6] Jean Bolot, Nadia Fawaz, S. Muthukrishnan, Aleksandar Nikolov, and Nina Taft.
2013. Private decayed predicate sums on streams. In ICDT. ACM, 284ś295.
[7] Daniele Dell’Aglio, Emanuele Della Valle, Jean-Paul Calbimonte, and Oscar Cor-
cho. 2014. RSP-QL Semantics: A Unifying Query Model to Explain Heterogeneity
of RDF Stream Processing Systems. Int. J. Semantic Web Inf. Syst. 10, 4 (2014),
17ś44.
[8] Daniele Dell’Aglio, Emanuele Della Valle, Frank van Harmelen, and Abraham
Bernstein. 2017. Stream reasoning: A survey and outlook. Data Sci. 1, 1-2 (2017),
59ś83.
[9] C. Dwork, M. Naor, T. Pitassi, and G.N. Rothblum. 2010. Differential privacy
under continual observation. In STOC. 715ś724.
[10] Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth. 2014. The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential
Privacy.
[11] Giulia C. Fanti, Vasyl Pihur, and Ulfar Erlingsson. 2016. Building a RAPPOR with
the Unknown: Privacy-Preserving Learning of Associations andData Dictionaries.
PoPETs 2016, 3 (2016), 41ś61.
[12] Javier D. Fernández, Axel Polleres, and Jürgen Umbrich. 2015. Towards Efficient
Archiving of Dynamic Linked Open Data. In DIACRON@ESWC. CEUR-WS.org,
34ś49.
[13] Steve Harris and Andy Seaborne. 2013. SPARQL 1.1 Query Language. W3C
Recommendation. W3C. https://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-query/
[14] Georgios Kellaris, Stavros Papadopoulos, Xiaokui Xiao, and Dimitris Papadias.
2014. Differentially Private Event Sequences over Infinite Streams. PVLDB 7, 12
(2014), 1155ś1166.
[15] Sabrina Kirrane, Serena Villata, and Mathieu d’Aquin. 2018. Privacy, security and
policies: A review of problems and solutions with semantic web technologies.
Semantic Web 9, 2 (2018), 153ś161.
[16] Danh Le Phuoc, Minh Dao-Tran, Josiane Xavier Parreira, and Manfred Hauswirth.
2011. A Native and Adaptive Approach for Unified Processing of Linked Streams
and Linked Data. In ISWC (1), Vol. 7031. Springer, 370ś388.
[17] Alessandro Margara, Gianpaolo Cugola, Dario Collavini, and Daniele Dell’Aglio.
2018. Efficient Temporal Reasoning on Streams of Events with DOTR. In ESWC.
Springer, 384ś399.
[18] Julian J. McAuley and Jure Leskovec. 2013. Hidden factors and hidden topics:
understanding rating dimensions with review text. In RecSys. ACM, 165ś172.
[19] Frank McSherry. 2009. Privacy integrated queries: an extensible platform for
privacy-preserving data analysis. In SIGMOD Conference. ACM, 19ś30.
[20] Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2008. Robust De-anonymization of
Large Sparse Datasets. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 111ś125.
[21] Nigel Shadbolt, Kieron O’Hara, Tim Berners-Lee, Nicholas Gibbins, Hugh Glaser,
Wendy Hall, and m c schraefel. 2012. Linked Open Government Data: Lessons
from Data.gov.uk. IEEE Intelligent Systems 27, 3 (2012), 16ś24.
[22] Robert H. Shumway and David S. Stoffer. 2005. Time Series Analysis and Its
Applications. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg.
[23] Roney Silva, Bruno Leal, Felipe Brito, Vânia Maria Vidal, and Javam C. Machado.
2017. A Differentially Private Approach for Querying RDF Data of Social Net-
works. In IDEAS. 74ś81.
[24] Latanya Sweeney. 1997. Weaving technology and policy together to maintain
confidentiality. J. of Law, Medicine and Ethics 25, 2ś3 (1997), 98ś110.
[25] Jun Tang, Aleksandra Korolova, Xiaolong Bai, Xueqiang Wang, and XiaoFeng
Wang. 2017. Privacy Loss in Apple’s Implementation of Differential Privacy on
MacOS 10.12. CoRR abs/1709.02753 (2017).
[26] Yuting Zhao, Guido Vetere, Jeff Z. Pan, Alessandro Faraotti, Marco Monti, and
Honghan Wu. 2015. Meta-Level Properties for Reasoning on Dynamic Data. In
JIST. Springer, 271ś279.
